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[L. A. No. 24197. In Bank. July 10, 1957.] 
KARGARET L. PLUMER, Respondent, 'Y. EVERETT T. 
PLUMER,Appellant. 
[1] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-
Meet of Agreement of Parties.-When an order for support 
payments in a divorce decree is based on an agreement of the 
parties; the possibility of subsequent modification of the order 
without the consent of both parties depends on the nature 
of the agreement. 
[I] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-E1feet 
of Agreement of Parties.-Where husband and wife agree to a 
simple division of their property or agree that one party is 
to receive the lion's share of the marital property and the 
other mouey payments, not in satisfaction of a statutory right 
to support but solely to equalize the division of the marital 
property, the agreement is a true property settlement uncon-
oerned with rights and duties as to support j the court may 
approve such agreement and in addition order the payment of 
alimony, and such order is subject to modification on an ade-
quate showing of changed circumstances. (Civ. Code, § 139.) 
[8] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effeet 
of Agreement of Partles.-Where husband and wife agree that 
the wife will receive specified money payments in lieu of the 
statutory right to support, such an agreement is a true "ali-
mony" or "support and maintenance" agreement, and a sup-
port order based thereon is modifiable on an adequate showing 
of changed circumstances. 
[4a-4c] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Modifieation of Allowanee-Ef-
fect of Agreement of Parties.-Where husband and wife enter 
into a hybrid agreement to settle not only property rights but 
rights and duties as to support, the possibility of modifying 
an order for support based on such an agreement without the 
consent of the parties depends on whether the provisions for 
division of property and the provisions for support are sever-
able rather than integrated; if they are integrated the order 
may not be modified unless the parties have provided for or 
agreed to such a modification. 
[5] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties: 
Modification of Allowanee.-An agreement between husband 
and wife is integrated if the parties .have agreed that the 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d. Divorce and Separation, § 217. 
McE.. Dig. Ref~nees: [1-4, 9, 10J Divorce, § 216(1) j [5] Di-
vorce, §§ 203, 216(1); [6-8] Divorce, § 203. 
) 
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provisions relating to division of property and those relating 
to support constitute reciprocal consideration, sinee the 811p-
port provisions are then necessarily part and parcel of a 
division of property; such an agreement would be destroyed 
by subsequent modification of a support order based thereon 
without the consent of the parties, and it is immaterial whether 
or not the marital property is divided equally, that the amount 
of the marital property is small, or that the agreement calls 
for payments for "support" or "alimony." 
[6] Id.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.-
An agreement between husband and wife providing that their 
purpose is to reach a final settlement of their rights and duties 
with respect to both property and support, that they intend 
each provision to be in consideration for each of the other 
provisions, and that they waive all rights arising out of the 
marital relationship except those expressly set out in the 
agreement, will be deemed conclusive evidence that they in-
tended an integrated agreement. 
[7] Id.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.-
Where husband and wife may be uncertain as to the value or 
legal ownership of property, or uncertain which of them is 
entitled to a divorce and on what grounds and therefore 
uncertain as to their legal rights with respect to support and 
the division of property, an agreement for a specified division 
of property and specified support payments settling sueh un-
eertainties is integrated in the absence of convincing proof 
that they intended it to be severable. 
[8] Id.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.-
Where an agreement between husband and wife deals both 
with rights to marital property and rights to support, and 
they have set forth their purpose "to effect a final and com-
plete settlement of their ... rights ... with reference to 
their marital status and to each other" and have released eacb 
other from all claims arising out of tbe marital relationship 
except as provided in the agreement, the inference is clear 
that the parties intended an integrated agreement j it is not 
necessary that they expressly recite such an intent when the 
agreement itself makes the~intent clear. 
[9] Id.-Permanent Alimony-Modi1ication of Allowance-Effect 
of Agreement of Parties.-A provision in an agreement be-
tween husband and wife that "For purposes of this agreement 
no earnings of Wife or other income obtained by her shall 
be considered as a 'changed condition' and taken into consider-
ation in connection with any attempt of Husband to obtain 
a reduction in payment for support of Wife or said child, ... 
except such portion of said earnings or other income as shall 
exceed the gros~ 'average monthly sum of Two Hundred Fifty 
) 
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Dollare," indicatea that the parties contemplated modification. 
on an adequate showing of changed oircumatancea with ai 
single limitation, that so long as the wife'a earnings or other' 
income did not exceed the monthly average of $250 any 
inereuse in her income would not be conaidered a changed 
condition. 
[10] ld.-Permanent AlimOD7-Kodi!cation of Allowance-BeCt 
of Agreement of Partiea.-A reduction in the amount ot pay- : 
menta for wife support would not violate a provision in an . 
agreement between the parties that "Husband's obligation 
to pa7 said alimony to Wife shan cease upon her death or 
remarriage, except that in the ease of her .remarriage laid 
payments shan be continued until five (6) y~re from [a 
designated date], notwithstanding the fact that Wife may have 
remarried within aaid period of time," linee such provision I 
deals only with the termination of support payments, Dot with 
their modi1leation. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County dismissing application for modification of a 
judgment of divorce. Elmer D. Doyle, Judge. Reversed. 
Fogel, McInerny & West, James E. West, Jr., and Steven 
Edmondson for Appellant. 
Hahn, RoIlS & Saunders and E. Lloyd Saunders for Re-
spondent. 
'l'RA YNOR, J.-On September 22, 1954, plaintiff and de-
fendant entered into an agreement "to effect a final and 
complete settlement of their respective property rights, sup-
port, alimony and custody of their child with reference to 
their marital status and to each other." Paragraph eight of 
the agreement obligates defendant to pay plaintiff $200 per 
month "for the support, maintenance, education, care and 
custody of said child until he shall reach the age of majority . 
. . . " Paragraph nine provides that defendant shall pay 
plaintiff an additional $200 per month "as alimony for her 
support and maintenance .... " In paragraph twenty-three 
each party releases the other from all present and future 
claims and rights to support, separate maintenance; alimony, 
court costs, attorneys' fees, and all property rights of any 
kind except as provided for in the agreement. Other para-
graphs deal with the division of marital property, the pay-
ment of debts, future education of the child, and termination 
and modification 'of the support provisions. 
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On November 1, 1954, an interlocutory decree of divorce 
was entered in plaintiff's favor, approving the agreement and 
ordering the performance of its terms. A final decree was 
entered on November 10, 1955, incorporating the provisions 
of the interlocutory decree. Plaintiff has since remarried. 
On December 21, 1955, defendant filed an order to show 
cause why the payments for support of plaintiff and the child 
should not be reduced on the ground that his income had 
materially decreased. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the order 
to show cause on the grounds that the payments were ordered 
pursuant to an integrated property settlement agreement and 
could be reduced only in conformity with the provisions of 
the agreement relating to modification and that these did not 
encompass a decrease in defendant's income as a basis for 
modification. After referring the matter to IL commissioner, 
who found in plaintiff's favor, the court dismissed the order 
to show cause. Defendant appeals, contending that the agree-
ment is not integrated and that even if it is, IL material 
reduction in his income is a ground for modification within 
the express provisions of the agreement. 
[1] When an order for support payments in a divorce 
decree is based on an agreement of the parties, the possibility 
of subsequent modification of the order without the consent 
of both parties depends on the nature of the agreement. 
Prior to Adams v. Adams, 29 Ca1.2d 621 [177 P.2d 265], the 
cases attempted to classify all separation agreements either 
as "property settlement" agreements or as "alimony" or 
"support and maintenance" agreements. (Ettlinger v. Ett-
linger, 3 Cal.2d 172, 177-179 [44 P.2d 540]; Puckett v. 
Puckett,21 Ca1.2d 833, 841-842 [136 P.2d 1] ; Hough v. Hough, 
26 Ca1.2d 605, 614-615 [160 P.2d 15].) If the underlying 
agreement was a "property settlement" agreement, the "sup-
port" order could not be modified without the consent of 
the parties. (Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, supra, 3 Ca1.2d at 177-
178.) Conversely, if the ungerlying agreement was for "ali-
mony" or "support and maintenance," the support order was 
modifiable upon a showing of changed circumstances. (Hough 
v. Hough, supra, 26 Cal.2d at 612.) In Adams v. Adams, 
supra, 29 Ca1.2d at 624-625, and in Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Cal. 
2d 36, 41 [265 P.2d 873], we recognized that hybrid agree-
ments to settle not only property rights but rights and duties 
as to support are sui generis. 
[2] The parties are free to limit their agreement to prop-
erty rights. They may, for example, agree to a simple divi-
) 
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sion. Or they may agree that one party is to receive the lio~~ 
share of the marital property and the other money payments,l 
not in satisfaction of a statutory right to support, but solely\ 
to equalize the division of the marital property; suchan! 
agreement is a true property settlement unconcerned 'witb1 
rights and duties as to support. The court, therefore, may I 
approve the agreement and in addition order the payment ol! 
alimony (Adams v. Adams, supra, 29 Ca1.2d at 625), and 1lUcm,,1 
an order is subject to modification on an adequate sbo'!'.iH'j 
of changed circumstances. (Civ. Code, § 139.) .: ~:~!."'."~ 
[3] The parties are likewise free to limit their agreem " .. , 
to their rights and duties as to support. They may,lW';l 
example, agree that the wife will receive specified .moii.i~ 
payments in lieu of the statutory right to support. Such @j 
agreement is a true "alimony" or "support and maintenance~ 
agreement, and under the rule of Hough v. Hough, IUprG,~~ 
Oa1.2d 605, 612, a support order based thereon is m . ..':Ii 
on an adequate showing of changed circumstances.", 
[4&] Frequently, however, the parties enter into a hybn': 
agreement as in the Adams and Dexter cases and in Me886'Agir~ 
v. Messenger, 46 Ca1.2d 619 [297 P.2d 988]. The possibilitT~ 
of modifyiJ:g an order for support based on such an agr~~ 
ment without the consent of the parties, depends upon wheth~.l 
the provisions for division of property and the. provisions f~A~ 
support are severable rather than integrated. If they ~:ii 
integrated the order may not be modified unless the partiesJ 
have provided for or agreed to such a modification. (Dexter ,./;~ 
Dexter, 8Upra, 42 Ca1.2d at 40.) ,'{~ 
[6] An agreement is integrated if the parties have agreed , 
that the provisions relating to division of property and the,'j 
provisions relating to support constitute reciprocal consider~.;:;: 
ation. The support provisions are then necessarily part and,~ 
'parcel of a division of property. Such an agreement would,~ 
be destroyed by subsequent modification of a support ord8f.~~ 
based thereon, without the consent of the parties. (Dexter ,£i 
Dexter, 8Upra, 42 Cal.2d at 41.42; Messenger v. Messeng6f"'! 
supra, 46 Cal.2d at 625, 627·628; Herda v. Herda, ant~;'i 
pp. 228, 231-232 [308 P.2d 705].) It is immaterial whetb~i 
or not the marital property is divided equally. (Dexter T.~ 
Dexter, 8Upra,42 Ca1.2d at 43; Messenger v. Messenger,IUpt'G,'; 
46 Oal.2d at 627-628.) It is immaterial that the amount ofj 
the marital property is small. (Herda v. Herda, supra, (JfIt6J~ 
at p. 232.) It is likewise immaterial that the agreement:~ 
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v. Messenger, supra, 46 Ca1.2d at 624-625 and cases there 
cited.) 
[4b] A support order based upon an integrated agreement 
may be modified if the parties so provide. (Flynn v. Flynn, 
42 Ca1.2d 55, 61 [265 P.2d 865].) Absent such a provision, 
it cannot. [6] An agreement providing that the purpose of 
the parties is to reach a final settlement of their rights and 
duties with respect to both property and support, that they 
intend each provision to be in consideration for each of the 
other provisions, and that they waive all rights arising out 
of the marital relationship except those expressly set out in 
the agreement, will be deemed conclusive evidence that the 
parties intended an integrated agreement. (Musenger v. 
Messenger, supra, 46 Ca1.2d at 628; Anderson v. Mart, 47 Cal. 
2d 274, 279 [303 P.2d 539] j Herda v. Herda, supra, ante, 
at p. 232.) Even absent one or more of the foregoing pro-
visions, there may be other proof that the parties intended an 
integrated agreement. (Dexter v. Dexter, rupra, 42 Cal.2d 
at 41.) [7] Thus, the parties may be uncertain as to the 
value or legal ownership of property. They may be uncertain 
which of them is entitled to a divorce and on what grounds 
and therefore uncertain as to their legal rights with respect 
to support and the division of property. An agreement for a 
specified division of property and specified support payments 
settling such uncertainties is integrated in the absence of con-
vincing proof that the parties intended it to be severable. 
(See Dexter v. Dexter, supra, 42 Ca1.2d at 48 j Musenger v. 
Messenger, supra, 46 Ca1.2d at 627-628.) 
[8] Under the foregoing rules the agreement in the present 
case is clearly integrated. It deals both with rights to marital 
property and rights to support. The parties have set forth 
their purpose "to effect a final and complete settlement of 
their ••. rights •.. with reference to their marital status 
and to each other." They have released each other from all 
claims arising out of the ~arital relationship except as pro-
vided in the agreement. The inference is clear that the 
parties intended an integrated agreement. It is not necessary 
that the parties expressly recite such an intent when the 
agreement itself makes the intent clear. (Dexter v. Dexter, 
supra, 42 Ca1.2d at 41.) 
[4c] Our conclusion that the agreement is integrated, how-
ever, does not dispose of the case, for, as noted earlier, an 
order for support b9S~d upon an integrated agreement may be 
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Flynn, S1tpra, 42 Ca1.2d at 61.) [9] Paragraph ten of the 
agreement provides: ., For purposes of this agreement no earn-
ings of Wife or other income obtained by her shall be consid-
ered as a 'changed condition' and taken into consideration in 
connection with any attempt of Husband to obtain a reduction 
in payment for support of Wife or said child, ... except such 
portion of said earnings or other income as shall exceed the 
gross average monthly sum of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars . 
. . . " Both parties concede that this part of the agreement 
provides for modification of the court's support orders. Plain-
ti1I contends, however, that the provision should be read as 
recognizing only a single ground for modification, namely, 
earnings or other income obtained by plainti1I in excess of 
an average of $2!50 per month. The plain language of the 
provision, however, indicates that the parties contemplated 
modification upon an adequate showing of changed circum-
stances with a single limitation, that so long as plaintiff's 
earnings or other income did not exceed the monthly average 
of $250, any increase in her income would not be considered 
a changed condition. We conclude, therefore, that upon a· 
proper showing of a material reduction in defendant's income, 
the trial court may in its judicial discretion modify its order 
requiring payments for the support of plainti1I and the child. 
[10] Plainti1I contends that a reduction in the amount of 
the payments for her support would violate a provision found 
in paragraph nine of the agreement, which reads: "Husband's 
obligation to pay said alimony to Wife shall cease upon her 
death or remarriage, except that in the case of her remarriage : 
said payments shall be continued until five (5) years from 
September 25, 1954, notwithstanding the fact that Wife may 
have remarried within said period of time." This provision, 
however, deals only with the termination of support payments, 
not with their modification. It provides only that "payments" 
shall continue, and a reduction in the amount of the payments 
pursuant to paragraph ten will not violate its terms. 
The order dismissing defendant's application for modifica- . 
tion of the decree is reversed for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
Gibson, C. I., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment. 
CARTER, J.-1 ~ent. 
The majority opinion is inconsistent in itself as weD as 
) 
) 
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with prior decisions of this court. In the case at bar it is 
held, by the majority, that the agreement under consideration 
was an integrated property settlement agreement which could 
not be modified unless the parties had agreed to a modifica-
tion. Then it is held that despite the fact that the agreement 
provided only one condition upon which the provisions could 
be modified, that defendant was entitled to a modification 
because his income had been reduced-a condition not men-
tioned in the agreement. 
Paragraph 10 makes provision for the modification of the 
agreement as follows: "For purposes of this agreement no 
earnings of Wife or other incomt: obtained by her shall be 
considered as a 'changed condition' and taken into considera-
tion in connection with any attempt of Husband to obtain a 
reduction in payment for support of Wife or said child, John 
Daniel Plumer, except such portion or-said earnings or other 
income as shall exceed the gross average monthly sum of Two 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00). 'Average Monthly' earn-
ings or income shall be computed on the basis of the total 
earnings or income of Wife (other than Husband's payments 
to her) for the twelve months prior to the filing of Husband's 
petition for reduction divided by twelve." The agreement is 
completeJy silent as to any other provision or stipulation for 
modification of the support payments to be made by the hus-
band. A majority of this court adds its own provision for 
modification to an admittedly integrated agreement and con-
cludes "that upon a proper showing of a material reduction 
in defendant's income, the trial court may in its judicial dis-
cretion modify its order requiring payments for the support 
of plaintiff and the child." That the support and mainte-
nance provisions of the agreement were intended as a division 
of property is clearly shown by the provision in the agree-
ment that the payments to the wife shall continue until her 
remarriage but that notwithstanding her ,.ema,.riage the pay-
ments are to be continued "ntil five yea,.s f,.om Septembe,. 
25,1954. In other words 'the parties intended that the wife 
was to receive a certain sum of money whether or not she 
remarried. A more complete expression of the parties' inten-
tion as to the division of their property is difficult to imagine. 
The majority, sensing a need to gloss over its interference 
with the parties' agreement, tells us that the provision whereby 
plaintiff was to receive payments for five years from Sep-
tember 25, 1954;' was a provision dealing ., only with the 
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It provides only that 'payments' shall continuE', and a redue-\ 
tion in the amount of the payments pursuant to paragraph: 
ten will not violate its terms. " The parties contemplated! 
only one reason for modifying the payments and that was if I 
the plaintiff's separate income exceeded $250 exclusive ofl 
the payments made to her by defendant. A majority of this! 
court has expanded the parties' agreement to include another \ 
reason-a reduction in the defendant husband's income. 
I am firmly of the opinion that, in the absence of consent I 
by the parties, a court has no power to modify an agreement, 
whether as to a division of their property or for the purpose of 
support, entered into by the parties when there has been no I 
fraud, overreaching or undue influence. Anything said by me t 
to the contrary in the case of Hough v. Hough, 26 Oa1.2d 60511 
[160 P.2d 15), is hereby expressly disapproved by me. In 
subsequent cases I have made my views clearly known (see I 
concurring and dissenting opinions in Dexter v. Dexter, 42\ 
Oa1.2d 86, 44 [265 P.2d 878] ; Fox v. Fox, 42 Ca1.2d 49, 581 
[265 P.2d 881]; Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Oa1.2d 55, 62 [265 P.2d, 
865] ; Anderson v. Mart, 47 CaUd 274, 284 [303 P.2d 589] ;! 
Herda v. Herda, ante, pp. 228, 235 [808 P.2d 705); and 
concurring opinion in Messenger v. Messenger, 46 Oa1.2d 619, 
680 [297 P.2d 988]). I feel that since the code (Oiv. Code, 
§§ 158, 159, 175) gives to the parties the right to contract with ' 
each other, their contract (in the absence of fraud or over-; 
reaching) should be accorded the same dignity accorded: 
other contracts. . 
In Dexter v. Dexter, rupra, 42 Ca1.2d 36, 42, a majority 
of this court there held: ". . . the court cannot, after the 
interlocutory decree has become final, add a provision for aU-
mony or modify the amount of payments ordered pursuant to 
a property settlement agreement. Accordingly, if plaintiff 
was satisfied with her contract whereby she had made 
the support and maintenance provisions an integral part of the 
settlement of property rights and had tenable grounds for 
setting it aside, she should have attacked the agreement before 
the interlocutory decree was entered. She cannot, however, 
after having secured its approval by the court and having 
accepted the benefits thereof, now seek relief inconsistent with 
its terms." (Emphasis added.) In the case at bar the 
majority admits that the agreement involved was an integrated 
property settIementagreement. It is even admitted that a 
property settlement' agreement containing support provisions 
cannot be modified in the absence of a provision in the agree-
.July 1957] PLUMER V. PLUMER 
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ment providing for modification. Having paid lip service to 
prior decisions, the majority then writes in its own provision 
for modification. It is at once apparent that the majority 
holding in the case at bar is directly contrary to what was 
held and said in the Dexter case in the passage heretofore 
quoted. In the case at bar, defendant husband accepted the 
benefits of his bargain and now seeks to be relieved of the 
burdens. 
In Fox v. Fox, supra, 42 Cal.2d 49, 52, 53, a majority of 
this court said: " ... it is clear that the provisions for the 
support and maintenance of plaintiff are an integral and in-
severable part of the property settlement agreement of the 
parties." And" Similarly, the fact that the payments might 
be reduced under certain specified circumstances does not 
indicate that they were alimony. Not only may the parties 
include such provisions in agreements that are admittedly 
solely property settlements (Hogarty v. Hogarty, 188 Cal. 
625, 628 [206 P. 79]), but the provision in this case lends 
support to the conclusion that at least part of the payments 
constituted a division of property as such. Thus in no event 
were the payments to fall below $200 per month, and they 
were to cease on a fixed date without reference to plaintiff's 
needs or defendant's abl1ity to pay after that time." (Em-
phasis added.) It should be recalled that in the case at bar 
plaintiff was to receive a definite sum regardless of her needs 
and regardless of defendant's ability to pay j and that the 
payments were to continue until a certain date regardless of 
plaintiff's remarriage. Only one specified condition W8.P 
made for modification and that condition has not been met. 
In Flynn v. Flynn, supra, 42 Cal.2d 55, 60, a majority of 
this court held: "An examination of the property settle-
ment incorporated by reference in the interlocutory decree 
makes clear that it is an integrated bargain of the type con-
sidered in Dexter v. Dexter, ante, p. 36 [265 P.2d 873], and 
Fox v. Fox, ante, p. 49 [265 P.2d 881]. Accordingly, the 
provisions for monthly payments may not be modified con-
trary to its terms . ... Since the parties have provided that 
the court may modify the payments ordered pursuant to the 
terms of their agreement, the court has jurisdiction to do so in 
accordance with the agreement." (Emphasis added.) It was 
concluded that the defendant might "renew his motion for 
a reduction in,the monthly payments in accordance with the 
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It appears to me tbat it sbould be obvious to lawyers and 
laymen alike tbat tbe bolding in tbe case at bar is wholly 
inc071sistent witb tbe bolding in tbe Flynn case. 
In Messenger v. Messenger, supra, 46 Ca1.2d 619, 626, a ma-
jority of this court beld tbat " ... the parties bave made tbe 
provision for support an integral part of tbeir property settle-
ment agreement." Tbat "Plaintiff was entitled to agree ... 
to an equal division of tbe community property in exchange 
for support and maintenance payments tbat could not be 
reduced." And that "Witb such conclusive evidence of 
integration, the provisions for support and maintenance or 
alimony would be subject to modification only if the parties 
expressly so provided. (See Flynn v. Flynn, supra, 42 Cal. 
2d 55, 61, and cases cited.) The court may not, however, 
'insert what has been omitted' (Code Civ. Proc., § 1858) and 
thereby abrogate the clearly expressed agreement of the 
parties." (Empbasis added.) In tbe case at bar this court 
has It inserted what has been omitted" and has, thereby, 
abrogated the" clearly expressed agreement of the parties"! 
So, again, the majority opinion is clearly inconsistent with 
its opinion in the Messenger case. 
In Anderson v. Mart, supra, 47 Ca1.2d 274, 279, a majority 
of this court, quoting from the Messenger case, held that 
the conclusion was inescapable that the parties had made 
the provision for the wife's support an integral part of the 
property settlement agreement. It was held that since the 
property settlement agreement made no provision for termi-
nation of the support payments to the wife and since the 
parties had not, in accordance with their agreement entered 
into a written modification of its terms, that the wife was 
entitled to recover from the husband's estate the present value 
of the amount attributable to her support for the remainder 
of her life expectancy. Tbe majority held, again quoting 
from the Messenger case, that ". . . the provisions for sup-
port and maintenance or alimony would be subject to modi-
fication only if the parties expressly so provided." The court 
refused to consider defendant's theory that the support pro-
visions were intended by the parties to end with the death of 
the payor and held that since there had been no written 
modification as provided for in the agreement the payments 
did not terminate. In the case at bar, no provision was made 
for modification of the wife's support payments in the event 
of a decrease in the husband's income but the majority of 
this court has geiterously supplied that omission and has 
, 
-) 
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abrogated the parties' clearly expressed agreement. (See 
Messenger v. Messenger, 46 Ca1.2d 619, 626 [297 P.2d 988J.) 
As I pointed out in my dissenting opinion in Herda v. 
Herda, supra, ante, pp. 228, 235, the majority reached an 
entirely different result on similar facts than was reached in 
the Anderson case. Here again it was held by the majority 
that the support payments were an integral and inseparable 
part of the property settlement agreement entered into be-
tween the parties. But even though no termination date was 
expressed in the agreement and even though no mention was 
made concerning the termination of the payments on the 
wife's remarriage or the death of the husband, a majority of 
this court held that "Since the agreement in the present 
case dealt primarily with support rights and the payments 
were described as for support and maintenance, it would be 
unreasonable to conclude that the agreement contemplated 
that the payments should continue for plaintiff'. [wife's] 
benefit after the obligation to support the children had ter-
minated .•.. " (Emphasis added.) In both the Herda and 
Anderson cases where different results were reached the ma-
jority relies upon the Messenger case. Because there was no 
provision for the support payments to cease upon the hus-
band's death, the majority in the Anderson case held that 
plaintiff was entitled to recover from the husband's estate 
for the balance of her life expectancy; in the Herda case, 
even though there was no provision for the wife's support 
payments to cease on her remarriage, the majority held that 
"it would be unreasonable to conclude" that the parties had 
not intended such payments to cease when the wife remarried. 
As long as a majority of this court continues to rewrite 
the parties' agreements for them, add provisions which are 
not present, constitute itself the trier of fact and, in general, 
refuses to permit property -settlement agreements to be en-
forced according to the rules applicable to other contracts, 
this state of ultimate confusion will exist in this field of the 
law in California. It is unfortunate that this court is the 
court of last resort in this field and that there is no higher 
authority to lay down a workable rule of law so that attorneys 
can, with some measure of certainty, advise their clients. 
I would affirm the order dismissing defendant '8 application 
for modification of the decree. 
